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Constitutionalism, legitimacy, and public order:
A South African case study
Forthcoming in Constitutional Triumphs, Constitutional Disappointments (Rosalind Dixon and Theunis
Roux, eds.) (Cambridge University Press, 2017).
Aziz Z. Huq, University of Chicago Law School

Why do constitutions, or the broader political orders that coalesce around them, persist?
One way to answer this question is to look at the institutional choices embedded in the text of the
relevant organic document to see whether their designers were far-sighted or not. 1 Another
approach is to ask whether they command the respect and loyalty of their citizenry. 2 Few
constitutions persevere through sheer force of arms, violence, or terror. As Max Weber (2009
[1922]) explained, the state—and hence the constitution upon which it rests—commonly relies on a
reservoir of popular support for its basic institutions.3 In the absence of positive dispositions on the
part of at least some substantial tranche of the people for some substantial part of the time, a state
must make large expenditures on coercion, surveillance, and control. Political scientists, legal
scholars, and social theorists operationalize this idea in terms of ‘legitimacy’.4 To be sure, the term
‘legitimacy’ has been challenged for its vagueness and opacity. 5 And it is always important to
distinguish “sociological legitimacy” (my focus here) from moral and legal variants.6 But legitimacy
remains a valuable tool for thinking about the preconditions of constitutional persistence.
The central role of ‘sociological’ legitimacy in the maintenance of a constitution as a going
concern raises a host of normative and empirical questions. What is the range of strategies for
building reserves of popular support for a constitution—understood as both the specific document
and the political order to which it is affiliated?.7 How do the specific conditions and circumstances
of a given nation at a particular moment in time cabin the range of potential legitimating strategies?
Constitutional legitimacy, that is, might be a highly contextual and path-dependent matter. An
obvious pathway is mediated by a claim to democratic credentials. Alternatively, societies or political
orders might be characterized by legitimation pathways that hinge on historical or religious
predicates (or, as in the United States, some confabulation of the two). Yet others – consider here
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recent experience of China under communist rule after 1980 – might endorse a relentlessly
consequentalist and welfarist criterion of legitimacy that is grounded on the promise of anticipated
economic growth for most (if not all). Among these diverse strategies, empirical questions arise
about how different pathways might interact to reinforce or undermine each other. And normative
questions might arise as to whether certain strategies of legitimacy are preferable to others. It might
be argued, for example, that a legitimating strategy that hinged on economic welfare while stifling
democracy was intrinsically inferior to one that relied on free and fair elections. The opposite
argument in favor of the post-Deng Xiaoping China model, of course, is also possible.
This chapter considers an important, but rarely considered, question about constitutional
legitimation: How might experiences with a particular kind of street-level bureaucrats8 influence the
legitimacy of a constitutional regime? 9 The post-apartheid experience of South Africa usefully
illuminates the possibility that public experiences with policing – or rather the want of sufficient,
effectual, and non-corrupt policing – can undermine trust in a government newly constituted under
a constitution. Police are important precisely because they are dispersed, numerous, and localized
representatives of the state. Members of the public are more likely to encounter police than judges,
elected officials, or other state officials. Their view of the state, in consequence, may well be
mediated by the behaviour of police. As a correlative, there is some evidence to suggest that
experiences with the police provide important signals of relative standing, recognition, and dignitary
worth to individuals.10
The functions of police in conveying information about the competence and integrity of the
state on the one hand, and in setting the terms of identification with the state on the other hand,
suggest that scholars of constitutional legitimacy should attend closely not solely to macro pathways
of constitutional legitimation, but also micro-level or retail dynamics. The persuasive hold of a
constitution, that is, might depend not just on high-profile questions of national policy. It might also
turn on the behavior of highly-dispersed officials, pursuing a range of state policies with high levels
of discretion, and connected into the larger network of state institutions through loose and
imperfectly-articulated nested sets of intrastate networks. This presents a significant question for
constitutional designers: perhaps the harvest from their labors depends not on their choices, but the
dispersed and hard-to-supervise decisions of a vast cadre of public officials at the front lines of
contact with the public. Although a constitution can include some tools for regulating may-level
bureaucracies, it seems likely that this control will be partial. As a result, a constitution will rise or fall
on the integrity of state institutions with only partial linkages to the document and the main
institutions of government created thereby.
South Africa provides a useful lens to study this question. As I explain below in Part I,
policing received careful attention in both the interim and permanent constitutions of the mid1990s. The assumptions animating these interventions, though, are at least up for debate. In Part II,
I explore in some detail how policing and the production of public order have remained a pressing,
8
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even intractable, problem for South Africans of all stripes. The realization of the ambitions of the
1996 Constitution thus proved elusive, at least in regard to policing. Moreover, recent empirical
studies suggest that this failure of the police to maintain public order is undermining the trust in the
state. Micro encounters with police hence seemed to have macro effects in terms of judgments about
the state as a whole. Part III then steps back and considers the possible consequences of this
dynamic for constitutional design, given the effort by the South African constitutional drafters to
influence the post-enactment path of policing.
I.

Policing and the 1996 Constitution

Criminality and private violence have presented tremendous policy challenges in South
Africa under its 1996 Constitution. The Constitution itself speaks both to the organization and the
practice of policing, albeit in inchoate and arguably ineffectual ways. Subsequent experience under
the 1996 Constitution suggests that the mechanisms included in that document, in addition to
subsequent statutes, have not oriented policing on the ground toward public-regarding ends. It is
useful to begin, though, by attending to the text itself.
South Africa is one of a handful of states to have had a system of racial hierarchy embodied
in law – the apartheid regime established in 1948 and finally and definitively repudiated by the
election of Nelson Mandela as president in 1994.11 The ensuing Constitution of 1996 was adopted in
the context of a transition from apartheid rule that was accomplished without large defections from
the police or other security services.12 Some changes to the national policing regime predated the
Constitution. Until 1994, the South African Police Force had been organized into eleven homelands
and tasked with maintaining a segregated polity.13 Police forces were further internally segregated,
with ill-trained black officers called kitskonstabels tasked with policing townships.14 In 1995, the police
force was centralized, the use of military ranks for officers was eliminated, and the ‘Force’ was
renamed a ‘Service’. The Internal Security Act was also amended to constraint the police use of
deadly force.15
In the context of these sustained efforts to shift the role of security forces away from the
promotion of racial stratification, it is hardly surprising that both the interim and the permanent
Constitutions of the mid-1990s would address the pathologies of Apartheid-era police regulation. To
begin with, the interim Constitution provided explicitly for community policing.16 Article 221 of that
document envisaged ‘community-police forums’ that would promote the ‘accountability of the
Service to local communities and co-operation of communities with the Service’ and evaluate ‘the
provision of visible police services, including … the provision, siting and staffing of police stations
11
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[and] … the reception and processing of complaints and charges’.17 Further, art. 222 stipulated an
‘independent’ complaints body that would operate under some form of ‘civilian’ control.18 These
shifts might be understood as efforts to make policing not only less racially segmented, but also as
levers to dislodge inherited policing patterns of physical abuse and malign neglect.
Both of these design choices reflect then-contemporary trends in policing. The former
provisions reflect the influence of an international movement toward community-oriented policing
that was emerging in Europe, America, and Australia in the 1980s and 1990s as a reaction against the
more technocratic style of policing that had dominated since the 1950s. 19 The core insight of
community policing strategies is that police and communities are ‘coproducers’ of security against
crime; this basic intuition can be executed in a wide range of different kinds of police-community
interaction.20 At the same time that community policing was coming into vogue, various forms of
‘independent’ review authority were being adopted, such as civilian complaint review processes and
auditors.21
Both design choices, furthermore, entailed literal transplantations of concepts and
institutional forms from other national contexts in ways that are open to question. For example, the
English scholar Michael Brogden has forcefully argued that the ‘community policing’ model rests on
assumptions about social structure and governance capacity that simply do not hold in contexts such
as South Africa’s, where the level of available bureaucratic capacity may not have equaled that of
Britain or the United States.22 Similarly, it is far from clear that ‘independent’ review authorities are a
panacea for police wrongdoing. Although internal investigatory processes can suffer from pro-police
bias, they might also benefit from better access to information to determine when potential
wrongdoing occurs, and what, in fact, happened. By contrast, independent bodies often depend on
police for this information. Further, whereas internal processes are often staffed by police officers
with experience with forensics and investigative techniques, there is no guarantee that such expertise
can be recruited for an external agency. The choice between internal and external accountability
mechanisms in the policing context, in short, presents a difficult trade-off between information and
impartiality. Depending on the context and the available resources, the trade-off may be best
resolved in quite different ways.
The 1996 Constitution, like its interim precursors, speaks directly to the core aims and the
structural organization of policing. In comparison to its interim precursor, it retreats from the
community-focused interim document, but preserves the idea of an independent police review
power. As in the interim Constitution, there is a specific section solely focused on policing. In
section 205 of the 1996 Constitution, the ‘objects of the police service’ are characterized in anodyne
and general terms: ‘to prevent, combat and investigate crime, to maintain public order, to protect
17
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and secure the inhabitants of the Republic and their property, and to uphold and enforce the law’.
Unlike section 221 of the interim Constitution, these general terms provide no direction as to the
nature of the relationship between the police and the public, or any obligations in respect to
procedural justice, community policing, or distributional equity. Indeed, it is possible to read the
1996 Constitution’s Article 205 as a volte-face from interim iteration’s section 221: where the latter
stressed the organic relationship between the police and the population they serve, the former
identifies abstract, technocratic objectives that sound in a more authoritarian ‘law and order’ register
than their precursors.
Yet the commitment to community-oriented policing did not vanish. In a 1998 White Paper
published by the Ministry of Safety and Security, the new government identified the creation of a
‘legitimate police service’ as a central goal of organizational and legal changes to policing.23 That
paper envisaged ‘a partnership between the police and communities’ to deliver effective security
(quoted in Minnaar 2009: 28).24 That is, what had previously been installed at a constitutional level
was sublimated into sub-legislative governmental policy. This shift, it should be noted, raises the
interesting question whether street-level policing might have been rendered more effective by a
constitutional commitment to community policing. Absent far more evidence, testing this
counterfactual is difficult.
Like the interim Constitution, the 1996 Constitution also speaks to questions of institutional
structure and accountability within the police force. In section 206, political responsibility for a
national policing strategy is shared between a cabinet-level official and provincial governments. It is
striking that the most substantive constraint upon policing policy reflects a concern with provincial
power, rather than individual or community-level interests, insofar as national policy must account
for ‘the policing needs and priorities of the provinces as determined by the provincial executives’.25
Section 207 envisages a national police commissioner with a level of managerial responsibility for
implementing the national policing strategy. The constitutional text is not clear as to whether this
official is supposed to have supervisory and corrective responsibility for lapses in the legality or
efficacy of policing. Nor is it clear that the office is vested with power to remedy such lapses.
Further, section 206(7) states that an ‘independent police complaints body established by
national legislation must investigate any alleged misconduct of, or offence committed by, a member
of the police service in the province’. In addition to reflecting international trends in police reform,
installation of independent police review could be usefully understood in light of the rise of
constitutionalized ombudsman institutions in the 1990s and 2000s focused on human rights or
corruption matters (Reif 2011). Like an ombudsman, an independent police review authority at least
seems to promise a neutral (if not necessarily well-informed) perspective on governmental
malfeasance. It is yet another effort to create a neutral, legalistic space within the state for realization
of rights free from short-term political hydraulics.
23
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Finally, although not explicitly tethered to policing, elements of the Bill of Rights further
speak to how police are envisaged as operating. Section 12 contains a commitment to the “free[dom]
from all forms of violence from either public or private sources.” Section 14 protects privacy from
searches and seizures in absolute terms, but is modified by the general limitations language of
section 36. The latter permits constraints that are ‘reasonable and justifiable in an open and
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant
factors elsewhere in the Constitution’. The parallelism with (and divergence from) the U.S. Fourth
Amendment is striking. Like its South African counterpart, the United States (U.S.) provision does
not protect against all searches and seizures, but only those that are ‘unreasonable’. Unlike the South
African document, the U.S. Constitution directs its energies at the margin to the regulation not of
executive-branch officers, but of judges. It imposes constraints on when and how (presumptively
judicial) warrants for searches and arrests can be issued. In practical effect, the U.S. Supreme Court
has often exploited the ambiguous term ‘unreasonable’ as a means to facilitate police discretion, but
rarely as a way to account for ‘human dignity, equality and freedom’.26
Calibrating the measure of appropriate police force in general terms presents a difficult
problem. Police routinely exercise force in order to limit or restrain private violence. The more
effective police are in this task, studies suggest, the less likely citizens are to endorse the extralegal
use of force.27 Hence, there is a trade-off in some instances between the police’s use of force and the
quantum of private violence. By lumping these two kinds of violence together, section 12 leaves it
unclear how the trade-off will be resolved. It is not clear the generic language of section 36 provides
more precise guidance. Just like the vaguer language of the U.S. Constitution, the South African
approach thus leaves crucial questions unresolved even at a fairly general level of abstraction.
II.

Policing and public order in the post-apartheid state

A.

Crime and policing under the 1996 Constitution

The aspirations of the 1996 Constitution in respect to policing and crime have not been
vindicated. South Africa remains deeply afflicted by crime. Recorded crime rose after the
establishment of democratic government, and, despite a reduction in some categories of violent
crime over the last decade, other forms of offending have increased. House robbery, for example,
almost doubled between 2002/03 and 2009/10, while business robbery increased 2.6 times over the
same period. In 2011, in a nation of about 49 million inhabitants approximately 50 murders, 100
rapes, 400 armed burglaries and 500 violent assaults were reported each day. 28 To put this in
perspective, South Africa’s murder rate in 2011 was about 7.9 times that of the United States. Even
as crime, violence and insecurity have become pervasive features of post-apartheid life, neither the
African National Congress’s (ANC) efforts to maintain social order against crime or to reorient the
South African Police Service (SAPS) prevailed. Rather, policing has continued to be pervasively
shaped by the historical legacy and contemporaneous effects of racial, economic, and geographic
26
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stratification.29 It has both reflected and shaped sharp economic and racial divides. Whether or not a
different constitutional design might have yielded different outcomes, therefore, it is clear that the
actually adopted constitutional design of post-apartheid policing resulted in national-level policy
failure.
Violent crime became a major national issue for the ANC in the late 1990s as the flush of
transformative change started to recede.30 A very early government response took the form of a
National Crime Prevention Strategy. This proved to be ‘stillborn’ and hence ineffectual.31 Postapartheid governments instead instigated organizational change policies that have purported to aim
toward a generally pro-active, community policing model. 32 For example, the police were
rechristened the South African Police Service. This organization folded together the police, and the
police forces of the former homeland—seemingly intently focused on a community-oriented form
of security.
But the reality has been quite different. Government and police have uniformly overpromised and under-performed in regard to what can be ‘delivered’. 33 The SAPS has been
continuously presented as the answer to crime, and there have been repeated attempts to import the
latest crime control models from Anglo-American police departments and academics.34 ‘Crime-talk’35
remains pervasive in the public sphere, revolving perennially around the failure of police and the
state to protect citizens from violent crime. In response, the state promoted its own effectiveness in
combating crime throughout the post-Apartheid period. This discourse persisted even as overall
crime rates rose, but has continued as those rates have fallen. This discourse ultimately led to the reemergence of paramilitary style policing around the year 2000 that culminated in 2009 with President
Zuma insisting the police were a ‘force’, not a ‘service’,36 a shift in language justified by an alleged
need to communicate to criminals that the state was not soft on crime.
Through this period, police increasingly relied upon apartheid-era policing modalities in
townships, in particular ‘high density, high mobility, paramilitary policing’.37 As Mark Shaw rightly
emphasizes, it is those who are poor and black who are most likely to be victims of this approach
(Shaw 2002: 14-15). 38 In contrast, the policing of urban business districts has been aimed at

29
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30
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preserving the exclusion of black township residents from those areas.39 The bifurcation of policing
strategies has exacerbated geographic segregation by race and income.
As a result of the durability of an ‘old’ policing culture, police relations with black urban
populations in particular have remained characterized by the same ‘strong mutual defiance’ that had
been observed during the late apartheid era (Fourchard 2011: 252).40 Police efficacy has suffered as a
result. Police morale also remains fragile. Using a narrative form, Jonny Steinberg vividly recounts
the fragility of police command of space in township areas, and the weakness of the formal
institutions of policing.41 Within the SAPS, he shows, morale remains low. This is perhaps not
surprising, since South Africa has one of the highest rates of police deaths in the world.42
Many people in South Africa report difficult relationships with the police. These negative
views seem to result from extremely negative experiences of police activity. In particular, the police’s
relations with young men from the townships are often tense.43 So, too, is their relationship with
immigrants and particularly undocumented foreigners, 44 or rape victims and other vulnerable
groups.45 As in any policing context, if people feel unfairly targeted, or that they are not receiving the
level of service they deserve when they report a crime, then the legitimacy of the police will likely
suffer. In contrast to this evidence, Kynoch reports perceptions that SAPS officers are more
approachable and respectful than their apartheid predecessors and that people expect the police to
serve all citizens rather than narrow sectional interests.46 That study is probably best read to suggest
that South Africans may at least be open to positive experiences of encounters with police given the
marginal improvement in policing since the early 1990s.
These problems are compounded by a long-standing problem of corruption. This
undermines attempts at legitimating the South African police. Police malpractice has been a major
concern in recent years as high-profile scandals reached the very top of the SAPS, including the
suspension, replacement and conviction of former national commissioner Jackie Selebi due to
alleged involvement in organized crime, and the suspension of his successor, Bheki Cele, in October
39
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40
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41
Steinberg, Thin Blue (n. 36).
42
D. Singh ‘Violators and victims: a historical review of policing in South Africa after a decade of democracy’
(2004) 17(3) Acta Criminologica 86–98.
43
M. Marks, Transforming the Robocops: Changing Police in South Africa (Durban: University Of KwaZulu-Natal
Press, 2005).
44
A. Mosselson, ‘“There is no difference between citizens and non-citizens anymore”: Violent xenophobia,
citizenship and the politics of belonging in post-apartheid South Africa’ (2010) 36(3) Journal of Southern African
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2011 based on corruption allegations. These problems appear to reach right down through the
organization.47 It is no surprise that there is an entrenched public perception that the SAPS is
corrupt.
Policing does not merely reflect South Africa’s internal conflicts. It also reproduces and
deepens them. Efforts to make the SAPS more diverse and inclusive have faltered, leading to limited
changes to police-community relations. In a 2008 ethnography of the Durban police, Monique
Marks found that ‘despite affirmative action and equity legislation and programs, Durban[’s police
force] was still plagued by deep racial and gender divisions’.48 Women and blacks, rather than being
welcomed, were marginalized by ‘police managers who are steeped in old ways’. Even to the limited
extent that the police have become more racially diverse, police recruited from townships quickly
cease to be identified as in-group members by those they police. As Steinberg (2012: 352) explains,
upwardly mobile police officers move to suburbs, ‘diving into a very deep pool of expensive private
services and a lifetime of debt’ scorned by the subjects of their policing.49
Relatedly, the salience of crime as an issue in South Africa and the social divisions fostered
by extreme inequality and the legacy of apartheid have, along with other factors, catalyzed alarming
displays of xenophobia. ‘Foreigners’, usually immigrants from other Sub-Saharan African countries,
but also internal migrants, are blamed by some for many social ills, including crime.50 The legitimacy
of the police may, again, be caught up in the social strain that produces and is reproduced by this
xenophobia.51 Yet the effect of rising xenophobia on public judgments about the police is likely to
be complex. Steinberg notes that anger toward immigrant groups was encouraged by state practices
as the government attempted to maintain its bond with the poor. But their negative views are often
motivated by anger at the perceived failure of the police to deal with immigrants’ purported
criminality.52
The failure of policing reform cannot be explained without attending to the deep, and
widening, socio-economic rifts within South African society. South Africa is characterized by high
economic inequality in comparison to other countries. According to the United Nations
Development Program, it has a Gini co-efficient of 57.8.53 Alongside Brazil, this makes it one of the
most economically unequal societies in the world. Economic inequality, moreover, tracks racial
divisions. Apartheid policies ensued that racial divides would translate into economic inequalities.
Apartheid ‘systematically and brutally’ entrenched economic inequality along racial lines. 54
Unsurprisingly, by the fall of the apartheid, income, employment, and education were distributed in
sharply uneven fashion between South Africa’s generally recognized racial groups (blacks, whites,
47
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48
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49
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50
Ibid.
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coloured, and Indians).55 Racial and economic divisions in South Africa also have a geographic
dimension that influences how police are deployed. Samara,56 has argued that urban centers, and in
particular, business improvement districts, have been developed in ways that preserve the
segregation of black townships from highly developed white urban areas. In his study of policing in
Cape Town, he emphasizes how private and public security is deployed to prevent the ‘spillover of
violence’ from the largely poor black townships of Cape Flats into the highly developed urban
center (Samara 2008: 204).57
A collateral effect of economic inequality is the temptation for the wealthy to ‘opt out’ of the
state system of social order maintenance through the purchase of private security and for the
impoverished to turn to vigilante organizations.58 The private security sector has grown rapidly since
the 1990s, fed in part by defections from the post-apartheid SAPS.59 Private and public policing
functions, however, are not cleanly separated, but characterized by a ‘growing interpenetration and
overlap’.60 Indeed, Marks and Wood present evidence that private security can interact directly with
community policing initiatives and thereby serve as a ‘more responsive and reliable’ substitute for
the SAPS.61 As a result of these trends, the provision of security is no longer exclusively (or even
centrally) associated with the state as opposed to private networks defined by solidarity group,
residence, or economic class. 62 Samara has demonstrated that the resulting proliferation of
geographically-sorted private policing produces a racial social ordering that tightly restricts the
mobility of the urban black poor.63
In contrast, some less wealthy South Africans have turned to vigilante organizations to
replace absent policing.64 Again, the resulting structures are not always easy to cleanly separate from
official state structures. Fourchard argues that grassroots vigilante organizations are hard to separate
from formal structures established through community policing initiatives from the late 1990s
onward.65
The experience of poor South Africans with the SAPS, finally, cannot be untangled from the
difficulties encountered by the post-Apartheid state. Failure to address backlogs in the provision and
maintenance of basic services may further erode police legitimacy. Put bluntly, when people do not
55
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have running water, or are forced to use unenclosed ‘street toilets,’ their sense that any state agency
can legitimately represent their interests may be undermined. There have been large protests in
recent years due to dissatisfaction with household service provision, access and quality. The police –
especially Public Order Police (POP) units – have played a key role in monitoring and quelling these
mass actions, and there have been a number of instances of police brutality, the most notable being
the killing of Andries Tatane, a protester in Ficksburg in Free State province in early 2011. Such
events may have strengthened the public’s perception of an association between policing and failures
in service provision.
b.

The failure of policing and constitutional legitimacy

The 1996 Constitution implied a promise of sound policing. The post-apartheid state has
thus far failed to deliver on that promise. But has this had any effect on the Constitution’s
legitimacy? Some evidence to that effect derives from a 2013 study conducted by a group of four
criminal-justice researchers (including myself). 66 That study drew on data from the 2010 South
African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS), an annual national survey of 3183 South African adults
aged 16 years and over conducted annually by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC). As
relevant here, the survey focused on how experiences with the police—in particular perceptions of
the police’s efficacy and fairness—influenced normative judgments about not only the police, but
also the state more generally. Our study did not ask about the Constitution. Nevertheless, it is
plausible to think that our findings about normative judgments about the post-apartheid state have
some correlation with normative judgments about the post-apartheid constitution.
A core finding of this study was that the legitimacy of the state was strongly correlated with
the polity’s experience of the police. Micro-level negative interactions with specific officers, in other
words, translated into a macro-level effect of state delegitimation. Citizens attended not only to the
effectiveness of the police when forming their legitimacy judgments in regard to the state, but also to
the fairness of their actions (e.g., whether they acted with respect and impartiality, allowed
individuals’ to voice their perspective, etc.). Consistent with a body of research that shows the
importance of ‘procedural justice’ in policing,67 the results suggested that citizen’s concerns about
crime should not be acted on at the expense of efforts to improve the more affective aspects of the
relationship between police and public. Correlatively, the study also found evidence that perceptions
of broader state failure influenced judgments about the police. That is, when the government’s
trustworthiness and performance is in doubt, the legitimacy of the police also suffers. Perceptions of
the policing function and of the state writ large were entangled. Police legitimacy is a vital element of
the wider legitimacy of any democratic state, and the failure of a police force to deliver security in an
efficient and fair manner can undermine the broader normative mandate of the state.
Experiences with police might have powerful effects on normative judgments of state’s
legitimacy for a number of reasons. Two are worth highlighting here. First, the police are at the front
lines of contact with the public. Police are especially likely to be present (or conspicuously absent) in
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stressful and emotionally charged situations such as the Marikana massacre of late September 2012.
Hence, it is likely that judgments about the overall competence and fairness of the state writ large
will be often inferred from experience with the state writ small, i.e., the police. Second, although
relatedly, experiences with the police, and in particular perceptions of how the police treats the
citizen, help form a sense of shared social identity and, correlatively, a sense of the citizen’s relative
standing as a citizen. As a result, policing has an ‘expressive’ effect.68
As the criminologist Ben Bradford has argued based on studies of the United Kingdom and
Australia, experiences of fairness at the hands of authority figures, such as police officers, has
positive effects on trust, legitimacy and people’s compliance-related behaviors, because such
experiences strengthen their connections to the social groups those authorities represent, promoting
allegiance to group norms and values (Bradford 2012;).69 Bradford suggests that people are sensitive
to signs and symbols that communicate information about their status and position within a group,
and that police treatment has an especially powerful communicative effect in this regard. His
research finds that people evaluate police behavior in terms of its identity-relevant content, in
particular, the message it conveys about membership in the nation. Policing – whether the failure to
provide security or the unwillingness to treat individuals with dignity and respect—sends a strong
message that an individual is not a coequal member of the polity. For the wealthy, it signals that the
state is unable to supply your basic needs. Such messages, in turn, seem to have consequences for
the legitimacy of the state. By extension, it is quite plausible to think that deterioration of moral
support influences public views on the Constitution too.
In sum, there is good reason to think that micro-level interactions with police have an effect
on macro-level normative beliefs about the state and the Constitution. A person whose daily
experience of the state is its failure to provide basic security against crime and violence, who then
finds the police to be corrupt and violent themselves, is not likely to have a positive view of other
state institutions. The leap of inference I am offering here – one that ought to be treated as a
hypothesis warranting further research rather than a solid conclusion – is to claim that this distrust
of the state will leak into judgments about the Constitution upon which the state rests as a matter of
law. In this way, the Constitution can be undermined as a legitimate instrument of government by
the dispersed and only partially controlled actions of its street-level agents.
III.

Theorizing the role of public order in constitutional legitimation

The South African experience suggests that policing and the problem of public order can
play a role in the legitimation or delegitimation of a new constitutional order. This dynamic
illustrates the possibility of linkages between the micro-level experiences of the state and macro-level
effects of legitimacy and stability. It thus illuminates one of the pathways that may connect the mass
of the public with relatively abstract constitutional dynamics. In this regard, it illuminates one
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modality of what might be called popular constitutionalism,70 albeit not only consciously or directly
focused on the text or substance of the constitution itself. This Part steps back by developing a
tentative account of when and how such popular constitutional effects might be observed, and what
implications for constitutional survival.
As a threshold matter, it is important to point out that state legitimation effects are not
contingent on a constitutional reference to policing. Even if the 1996 South African Constitution
had said not a word about policing or public order, the efficacy and fairness of individual officers
could still have had an effect upon state and constitutional legitimacy. A constitution might thus
founder due to omissions, or because it speaks to policing and public order in a suboptimal fashion.
Similar effects have been found in a wide range of other national contexts, from the United States71
to Ghana, 72 without regard to constitutional commitments to public order. The promise of
maintaining an effectual monopoly on violence, per Weber, may well be so ingrained in
understandings of what a state is that constituting documents do not need to spell this out in order to
create public expectations.
At the same time, the South African experience shows that a state’s failure to supply public
order may not prove fatal (in the sense of precipitating constitutional change) or even debilitating to
the continued operation of a constitutional order. A state may rely on plural sources of legitimation.
These might include a historical claim to be an authentic voice of the ‘people.’ This may be a claim
with special potency in the South Africa for blacks at least. Until recently, the ANC had an effectual
monopoly on political power. In August 2016, however, the party experienced an unprecedented
string of electoral defeats at the municipal level, including in important cities such as Pretoria, where
blacks make up three-quarters of the population.73 A large question for the future stability of the
South African constitutional order, therefore, may be whether a new class of political leaders can
identify alternative pathways to state legitimacy even as the institutional apparatus of the state
(including the police) are likely to remain highly corrupt and incompetent, so as to limit the delivery
of effectual services. Different political parties have taken different positions in respect to this
question, with the Democratic Alliance striving most clearly to position itself as the party of delivery
rather than the custodian of a national, democratic revolution. Other states with similarly deficient
systems for service delivery have resorted to quite different legitimation strategies, and continue to
survive (if not prosper in any conventional way) by focusing on the promise of external threats. The
current North Korean and Iranian regimes provide useful examples in this regard.
A selective failure to supply public order, moreover, may be unjust but also remarkably
stable. In the United States, for example, local and state police have a long history of both
withholding effectual protection and also imposing supernumerary coercion on racial minorities.
One consequence is that for racial minorities in the U.S. today, contact of any form with the criminal
justice system tends to be politically enervating in the sense that it is associated with lower levels of
70
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political and civil engagement a trend that is likely to worsen with time.74 The result is a stable
negative feedback loop: negative encounters with police reinforce minorities’ sense that they are not
coequal citizens, which in turn leads them to give up on voting and other forms of civic engagement.
Their disengagement in turn diminishes the chances of meaningful reform of policing emerging
from the political process. A stable constitutional order, the American experience shows, can coexist
with persistent racial (or social) stratification of a deeply iniquitous sort.
Conclusion
The post-apartheid state’s failure to deliver on constitutional promises of public order and
effectual security is an important determinant of state and constitutional legitimacy, even if it does
not fatally undermine the prospects for the 1996 Constitution’s continued survival. On a more
general, theoretical level, the dynamics illuminated here illustrate the connection between macrolevel dynamics of constitutional legitimacy with micro-level interactions occurring between
individual citizens and street-level agents of the state. This micro/macro connection suggests that
constitutional survival should be conceptualized as a problem of ordinary politics and
administration, as much as a question of high theory and normative principle.
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